 |
You need to login
to edit this page
|
|
|
AH-64 Operations In Afghanistan
From US Army Safety Program website
From January to July 2002, our company was deployed to
Afghanistan in support of Task Force Rakkasan for
Operation Enduring Freedom. We are an AH-64A attack
helicopter company assigned to the 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault).
During the deployment, we were exposed to
a wide range of temperatures, a variety of flight
environments, and altitude extremes that we had never
operated in before.
br>
We arrived in Afghanistan near the end of January and
were based out of Kandahar International Airport. Kandahar is approximately
3,500 feet mean sea level (MSL) and can be characterized as high desert.
The terrain is relatively flat with rolling sand dunes 10 miles west and
a mountain range approximately 15 miles to the north. Temperatures during
January were mild with an average daytime temperature of 12 to 15 degrees
Celsius (53º-59ºF).
During the winter months at Kandahar, our aircraft
performed well. We had six
aircraft equipped with T700-GE-701C engines and two
equipped with T700-GE-701 engines. On a daily basis, we had power
available to hover out of ground effect (OGE). Even though we had OGE power, we
still had to pay close attention to our TGT because we were operating
close to dual engine automatic TGT limiting. We knew that it would not be long
before power was a luxury that we would not have.
Within three weeks of our arrival, our missions started
taking us to higher and higher altitudes. Prior to my arrival in Afghanistan,
I had never been above 10,000 MSL in an Apache. Our first mission took us
from Kandahar to Bagram Airbase to refuel and then on to the eastern city
of Khowst. While en route to Khowst, we crossed a snow-covered mountain at
11,500 MSL. The free air temperature was -15 degrees Celsius (5º) when we
crossed the peak.
While climbing to cross the peak, I applied my maximum
torque available from my PPC and noticed that I was not close to TGT limiting.
I slowly increased the power until I drooped the rotor and then decreased
the collective. I still had not reached TGT limiting, but the droop in rotor RPM
was the result of fuel flow limiting. I knew fuel flow limiting existed and
how to attain the information from chapter seven of my operator’s manual,
but had never been exposed to it before.
By the end of April, the temperature at Kandahar was
nearing 100 degrees
Fahrenheit. We had power to hover in ground effect (IGE),
but we no longer had power to hover OGE. We had already conducted numerous
missions to include Operation Anaconda. We had fought at altitudes
from 8,200 MSL to 10,500 MSL using running fire tactics. The racetrack
patterns and running fire tactics we utilized were necessary due to insufficient
power to hover and to increase our own survivability.
Performance planning was a critical part of each
mission. Each mission required performance planning for altitudes,
temperatures, and gross weights
that were much higher than we normally operate. During
our missions in Afghanistan, we had two aviators assigned to our
performance-planning cell.
This cell always contained at least one of the unit
instructor pilots.
By the time we left Afghanistan, we had operated at
altitudes from 3,500 MSL to 12,500 MSL. We had operated in temperatures from
-15 degrees Celsius to temperatures in excess of 50 degrees Celsius
(122ºF). We quickly
learned that power management was a skill necessary to
survive our deployment. We adapted to this environment well, but were
fortunate to have a wealth of experienced aviators in our company. A
valuable lesson learned from this deployment is that units should focus
early on power management issues and train accordingly so that they are
prepared when deployed.
CW3(P) Rich Chenault
A/3rd Battalion,
101st Avn Regt,
Fort Campbell, KY, USA
|
|
|
|
 
|
