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Operation Eagle Claw
On 4 November 1979, after a popular revolution swept the Shah of Iran, a close American
ally, out of power, Iranian students backing the new revolutionary Islamic government stormed
the US embassy in Teheran and took the staff and USMC security contigent hostage. In all, 52
Americans were captured and it was unclear whether they were being tortured or readied
for execution. After six months of failed negotiation, the US broke diplomatic relations
with Iran on 8 April 1980 and the newly certified US Army Special Forces Operational
Detachment-Delta (Airborne) was put on full alert and plans were being drawn up for a rescue.
The Americans faced a daunting task. Teheran is well inside Iran and away from friendly
countries. The hostages were not held at an airport as in Israel's four years earlier Entebbe raid.
Good intelligence was hard to come by about forces inside the embassy and in Teheran.
And of course, all the planning and training had to be carried out in complete secrecy.
Initially, the preferred solution was the infiltration of the force by trucks from
Turkish territory but this plan was rejected due political disadvantages and the risk of a
great number of casualties made to discard the possibility of a night paratroopers assault so
the choice fell again, after all, on the use of helicopters.
By December 1979, a rescue force was selected and a training program was under way.
Training exercises were conducted through March 1980 and the Join Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved mission execution
on 16 April 1980. Between 19 and 23 April, the forces deployed to Southwest Asia.
What was ultimately decided on was an audacious plan involving all four US armed forces services,
8 helicopters (Navy RH-53D's with USMC crews), 12 USAF planes ( 4 special ops MC-130E Combat Talon,
3 command post EC-130E Commando Solo, 3 gunships AC-130 Spectre, and 2 cargo C-141 Starlifter ), and
numerous operators infiltrated into Teheran ahead of the actual assault.
Aircraft carriers USS Nimitz (CVN68) and USS Coral Sea (CV43) were already in the Arabian Sea
to provide air support if necessary with their F-14A Tomcat, A-6E Intruder and A-7E Corsair.
The basic plan was to infiltrate the operators into the country the night before
the assault and get them to Teheran, and after the assault, bring them home.
The first night, three MC-130's Combat Talon were to fly to an barren spot in Iran and
offload the Delta force men, Combat Controllers, and translators/truck drivers. Three EC-130's
following the Combat Talon's would then land and prepare to refuel the Marine RH-53's
flying in from the carrier USS Nimitz. Once the helicopters were refuled, they would fly the
task force to a spot near the outskirts of Teheran and meet up with agents already
in-country who would lead the operators to a safe house to await the assault the next night.
The helicopters would fly to another site in-country and hide until called by the Delta
On the second night, the MC-130's and EC-130's would again fly into the country, this time
with 100 US Army Rangers troops, and head for Manzariyeh Airfield. The Rangers were to assault
the field and hold it so that the two C-141's could land to ferry the hostages back home.
The three AC-130's would be used to provide cover for the rangers at Manzariyeh, support Delta's
assault, and to supress any attempts at action by the Iranian Air Force from nearby
Mehrabad Airbase. Delta would assault the embassy and free the hostages, then rendevous
with the helicopters in a nearby football stadium. They and the hostages would be flown
to Manzariyeh Airfield and the waiting C-141's and then flown out of the country. All
the aircraft but the eight helicopters would be flown back, the helicopters would be
destroyed before leaving.
The RH-53D ( Sikorsky S-65 ) was the specialized mine
countermeasures variant ( fitted with devices for the detection, sweeping and neutralization
of all types of mines ) of the CH-53 Sea Stallion .
The US Navy received the first of 30 RH-53D in May 1973 to replace the old RH-3A
Sea Kings and, coincidentally, the only other customer of the RH-53D was
the Iranian Navy with 6 aircraft delivered to the Shah.
The determination of the type of helicopter to be used was very difficult but the Sea Stallion
was selected in good part due to its great capacity to carry heavy loads. Completely supplied
can take 30 people and with less fuel 50 with a maximum gross weight of 42,000 pounds (15 Tn aprox)
and is capable of speeds up 160 knots. In spite of it's huge size, the Sea Stallion has
been known to make a few loops from time to time.
The RH-53D variant had extra fuel tanks on the landing gear pylons so this aircraft was preferable to
the normal CH-53D due it's long range. A year before, on April 1979 a RH-53D from US Navy
squadron HM-12 set a new nonstop transcontinental flight by flying from Norfolk, Virginia, to
San Diego, California. The helicopter flew 2,077-nm in 18.5 hours, air refueling from an
Air National Guard HC-130 Hercules. The flight demonstrated the long-range, quick-response
capability of the RH-53D helicopter and was commanded by Lieutenant Rodney M. Davis.
But moreover a hunting-mines helicopter would not seem outside of place on board an
In October 1979, US Navy Squadron HM-16 was participating in Canous Marcot 79, a joint
U.S. - Canadian exercise, shore based at CFB Shearwater, Nova Scotia, Canada. The
squadron's prime objective was to clear a simulated minefield blocking this major
strategic Canadian port. Four days after returning from this Canadian deployment,
HM-16 was tasked to execute a no-notice rapid deployment to the Indian Ocean area.
Within a 34 hour period, all personnel and squadron assets were deployed from the
commands home base in Norfolk, Virginia and stationed aboard carrier USS Nimitz where
their RH-53's were painted brown for the camoflauge effect of the Iranian desert and
to be similar to Iranian aircraft paint schemes.
HM-16 provided the eight helicopters for Eagle Claw and was until 19 May 1980
when the squadron returned to Norfolk after an unprecedented 193 days continuous at sea.
On the evening of 24 April 1980, six C-130s left Masirah Island, Oman, and eight RH-53D
helicopters departed the USS Nimitz in the Arabian Sea. Both formations headed for the
location code-named Desert One.
A month before the assault a CIA
had flown to Desert One. A USAF Combat Controller had rode around the landing area on a
light dirt bike and planted landing lights to help guide the force in.
That insertion went well, with no contact, and the pilots reported that their sensors had
picked up some radar signals at 3,000 feet but nothing below that.
Despite these findings, the helicopter pilots were told to fly at or below 200 feet to
avoid radar. This limitation caused them to run into a haboob, or dust storm, that they
could not fly over without breaking the 200 foot limit. Two helicopters lost sight of the
task force and landed, out of action. Another had landed earlier when a warning light
had come on. Their crew had been picked up but the aircraft that had stopped to retrieve
them was now 20 minutes behind the rest of the formation.
Battling dust storms and heavy winds, the RH-53's continued to make their way to
Desert One. After recieving word that the EC-130's and fuel had arrived, the two aircraft
that had landed earlier started up again and resumed their flight to the rendevous.
But then another helicopter had a malfunction and the pilot and Marine commander decided
to turn back, halfway to the site. The task force was down to six helicopters,
the bare minimum needed to pull off the rescue.
The first group of three helicopters arrived at Desert One an hour late, with the rest
appearing 15 minutes later. The rescue attempt was dealt it's final blow when it was learned
that one of the aircraft had lost its primary hydralic system and was unsafe to use fully
loaded for the assault. Only five aircraft were servicable and six needed, so the mission
And there were other problems. A bus came by on a dirt road shortly after the lead
C-130 landed. Its driver and about 40 passengers were held until the Americans left.
With the mission already aborted, things got worse when one of the helicopters moved to another position and
drifted into one of the parked EC-130's. In the pilot's defense, it was dark and his rotors kicked up an immense dust cloud, making it difficult to see but immediately both the C-130 and RH-53 burst into flames, lighting up the dark desert night, and 8
crewmembers lost their lives.
CAPT   Harold L. Lewis Jr.    USAF EC-130E A/C Commander
CAPT   Lyn D. McIntosh    USAF EC-130E Pilot
CAPT   Richard L. Bakke    USAF EC-130E Navigator
CAPT   Charles McMillian    USAF EC-130E Navigator
TSGT   Joel C. Mayo     USAF EC-130E Flight Engineer
SSgt   Dewey Johnson     USMC RH-53D Crewmember
Sgt    John D. Harvey     USMC RH-53D Crewmember
Cpl    George N. Holmes    USMC RH-53D Crewmember
The C-130 was evacuated and the order came to blow the aircraft and exfiltrate the country.
However, in the dust and confusion the order never reached the people who would blow the
aircraft. There were wounded and dying men to be taken care of and the aircraft had to be
moved to avoid having the burning debris start another fire. Because of this failure to
destroy the helicopters, the Americans left behind them 5 RH-53D intact and top secret plans
fell into the hands of the Iranians the next day and the agents waiting in-country to
help the Delta operators were almost captured.
Debris of the EC-130E BuNo 62-1809 Lockheed Hercules c/n 3770
"A few days ago the President made a very courageous decision as he ordered us to execute
the rescue operation as we tried to free our Americans held hostage in Teheran. It was
not a risk-free operation-there is no such thing as a risk-free operation..... we all
shared considerable disappointment that we were not successful. But let's not be
despondent about that. Our job is now to remain alert, to look for those opportunities,
times when we can bring our Americans out. Our job is to stay ready."
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations, in a video message to USS Nimitz,
USS Texas and USS California during their transit home from the Indian Ocean.
After Eagle Claw a long negotiation follows, including the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war.
Was on 19 January 1981 when Secretary Christopher signs the accord at 3:35 E.S.T. and on
January 20, after last-minute delays over fund transfers,
the hostages leave Teheran on the 444th day of their captivity, minutes after President Carter
leaves office. On January 21, citizen Carter greets the hostages at Weisbaden, West Germany.
Operation Honey Badger which was to be the second attempt to rescue
the hostages from Iran was no longer necessary.
A six-member commission was appointed by the JCS to study the operation. Headed by Adm James
L. Holloway III, the panel included Gen LeRoy Manor, who commanded the Son Tay raid, November 21, 1970
in Vietnam to rescue prisioners.
One issue investigated was selection of aircrew. Navy and Marine pilots with little experience
in long-range overland navigation or refueling from C-130s were selected though more than a
hundred qualified Air Force H-53 pilots were available. Another issue was the lack of a
comprehensive readiness evaluation and mission rehearsal program. From the beginning,
training was not conducted in a truly joint manner; it was compartmented and held at
scattered locations throughout the US. The limited rehearsals that were conducted
assessed only portions of the total mission. Also at issue was the number of
helicopters used. The commission concluded that at least ten and perhaps as many as
twelve helicopters should have been launched to guarantee the minimum of six required
for completion of the mission. The plan was also criticized for using the "hopscotch"
method of ground refueling instead of air refueling as was used for the Son Tay raid.
By air refueling en route, the commission thought the entire Desert One scenario could
have been avoided.
Although the results of the mission were tragic, Operation Eagle Claw’s contribution to the
American military was invaluable. The lessons learned from the mission illustrated serious
deficiencies in the capability of the American military. The mission forced the political
and military leadership to address these inadequacies and initiate changes. Military reforms
would be complete and revolutionary. In particular, the mission was a major contributor to
the changing of service parochialism. The mission contributed to the development of Jointness.
Eagle Claw identified Helicopters
RH-53D serial number 158761 destroyed in collision with EC-130E BuNo 62-1809
Five more RH-53D abandoned or destroyed at Desert one.
See RH-53D Production List
|OLD CCT ( USA ) |
You might want to expand the info about 1st insertion by Coach Carney & Team.... There was more than one.
Terence M. ( Brockton MA )
I was stationed at Ramstein Germany in 1980 and was sent TDY to Wadi Kena. I had orders to Sigonella air Station Sicily, but actually was sent to the WADI. Are there any campaign ribbons or such that were awarded to service members that were sent on this deployment? It was part of Operation Eagle Claw.
Mark B. ( Laguna Niguel, CA )
I flew OH-58s and Huey UH-1Ds in West Germany prior to and during the Eagle Claw mission. We would train at night, with night vision goggles, flying NOE (Nap-of-the-earth), in squadrons, with all running lights off.
The UH-1D has a self purging particle separator, not a material filter as in the Navy and Marine helicopters, so we never had to worry about filter changes or air inlet flow restrictions. This mission should have been flown by Army helicopter pilots in Army helicopters. If they had, you have no loss of aircraft and no pilot error.
We logged tens of thousands of hours flying tactical at night with these helicopters. Why the Joint Chiefs went with non-Army pilots and helicopters is beyond all reason.
Rich K ( Massachusetts )
I respect your service but with all due respect to those who participated in the mission, you have no idea what the results would have been if Army pilots were in command.
notgiven ( nevada )
I was a CMC onboard CV61 during Eagle Claw. The night before the helos took off, I received a Secret msg that indicated the helos had been damaged by AFFF during a false fire alarm in the Hangar Bay. Crews in the bay were up all night repairing (cleaning) the helos, since AFFF is corrosive. To this day I am sure that the helos that failed did so because of damage to their systems by AFFF. This is never mentioned anywhere in UNCLAS docs. In my book, that confirms this factor in the failure of Eagle Claw. Semper Fi to all.
Jeff ( Kajaki Dam )
Does anyone know if the four abandoned 53s were placed into Iranian service?
Jerry P ( Sturgis, SD )
The first Marines to enter the Indian ocean since WWII was the 31st Marine Amphib Unit. About a Marine Battalion plus all the extras. I was in the 31st M.S.S.G as a Shorepartyman (Red Patcher) Our job discription included running L.Z.\s . We were with the Nimitz when it launched the mission. Later we received the Marine Corps Expeditionary medal. I always wondered what would have happen if we were there. I was on the L.K.A. 115 Mobile.
Pete ( Iowa )
During Operation Desert Shield / Storm I was a CH-53D crew chief with HMH-462. An Iranian pilot had defected with his family to Saudi Arabia prior to our arrival in Aug 1990. Left behind for the Saudis was the Iranian RH-53D. It had not flown in a while, so we were asked by the Saudis to work on the aircraft and make it ready for flight. It was done smartly and professionally. Prior to the commencement of Desert Storm in January, we had a crew fly the aircraft to a neutral border location. As I understand it was transferred to an Iranian crew and returned to Iran. Not sure if this was one from the Eagle Claw operation at Desert One, but it was painted with the Iranian Navy paint scheme. Interestingly the only guy in our squadron with Combat Aircrew wings at that time was a Sgt who was on that mission. First time I had seen these wings, and later earned them. // Also Mark B. - interesting bravado about Army aviation. I have reviewed enough Army mishaps in my work with survivability, some with TACOPS officers who were of the highest seniority. it is the training, planning, equipment and attitude of the crew that drives success, not the service branch. Army has lost a tremendous amount of helps due to brown-outs, rollovers and other mishaps in AFG. I am not knocking Army pilots, just rebutting they are not bulletproof as you suggested.