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Operation Eagle Claw
The Americans faced a daunting task. Teheran is well inside Iran and away from friendly countries. The hostages were not held at an airport as in Israel's four years earlier Entebbe raid. Good intelligence was hard to come by about forces inside the embassy and in Teheran. And of course, all the planning and training had to be carried out in complete secrecy. The PlanInitially, the preferred solution was the infiltration of the force by trucks from Turkish territory but this plan was rejected due political disadvantages and the risk of a great number of casualties made to discard the possibility of a night paratroopers assault so the choice fell again, after all, on the use of helicopters. By December 1979, a rescue force was selected and a training program was under way. Training exercises were conducted through March 1980 and the Join Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved mission execution on 16 April 1980. Between 19 and 23 April, the forces deployed to Southwest Asia.
The basic plan was to infiltrate the operators into the country the night before the assault and get them to Teheran, and after the assault, bring them home. The first night, three MC-130's Combat Talon were to fly to an barren spot in Iran and offload the Delta force men, Combat Controllers, and translators/truck drivers. Three EC-130's following the Combat Talon's would then land and prepare to refuel the Marine RH-53's flying in from the carrier USS Nimitz. Once the helicopters were refuled, they would fly the task force to a spot near the outskirts of Teheran and meet up with agents already in-country who would lead the operators to a safe house to await the assault the next night. The helicopters would fly to another site in-country and hide until called by the Delta operators. On the second night, the MC-130's and EC-130's would again fly into the country, this time with 100 US Army Rangers troops, and head for Manzariyeh Airfield. The Rangers were to assault the field and hold it so that the two C-141's could land to ferry the hostages back home. The three AC-130's would be used to provide cover for the rangers at Manzariyeh, support Delta's assault, and to supress any attempts at action by the Iranian Air Force from nearby Mehrabad Airbase. Delta would assault the embassy and free the hostages, then rendevous with the helicopters in a nearby football stadium. They and the hostages would be flown to Manzariyeh Airfield and the waiting C-141's and then flown out of the country. All the aircraft but the eight helicopters would be flown back, the helicopters would be destroyed before leaving. The Helicopters
The determination of the type of helicopter to be used was very difficult but the Sea Stallion was selected in good part due to its great capacity to carry heavy loads. Completely supplied can take 30 people and with less fuel 50 with a maximum gross weight of 42,000 pounds (15 Tn aprox) and is capable of speeds up 160 knots. In spite of it's huge size, the Sea Stallion has been known to make a few loops from time to time. The RH-53D variant had extra fuel tanks on the landing gear pylons so this aircraft was preferable to the normal CH-53D due it's long range. A year before, on April 1979 a RH-53D from US Navy squadron HM-12 set a new nonstop transcontinental flight by flying from Norfolk, Virginia, to San Diego, California. The helicopter flew 2,077-nm in 18.5 hours, air refueling from an Air National Guard HC-130 Hercules. The flight demonstrated the long-range, quick-response capability of the RH-53D helicopter and was commanded by Lieutenant Rodney M. Davis. But moreover a hunting-mines helicopter would not seem outside of place on board an aircraft carrier. In October 1979, US Navy Squadron HM-16 was participating in Canous Marcot 79, a joint U.S. - Canadian exercise, shore based at CFB Shearwater, Nova Scotia, Canada. The squadron's prime objective was to clear a simulated minefield blocking this major strategic Canadian port. Four days after returning from this Canadian deployment, HM-16 was tasked to execute a no-notice rapid deployment to the Indian Ocean area. Within a 34 hour period, all personnel and squadron assets were deployed from the commands home base in Norfolk, Virginia and stationed aboard carrier USS Nimitz where their RH-53's were painted brown for the camoflauge effect of the Iranian desert and to be similar to Iranian aircraft paint schemes. HM-16 provided the eight helicopters for Eagle Claw and was until 19 May 1980 when the squadron returned to Norfolk after an unprecedented 193 days continuous at sea. 
GoOn the evening of 24 April 1980, six C-130s left Masirah Island, Oman, and eight RH-53D helicopters departed the USS Nimitz in the Arabian Sea. Both formations headed for the location code-named Desert One.First Problems
Despite these findings, the helicopter pilots were told to fly at or below 200 feet to avoid radar. This limitation caused them to run into a haboob, or dust storm, that they could not fly over without breaking the 200 foot limit. Two helicopters lost sight of the task force and landed, out of action. Another had landed earlier when a warning light had come on. Their crew had been picked up but the aircraft that had stopped to retrieve them was now 20 minutes behind the rest of the formation.
The first group of three helicopters arrived at Desert One an hour late, with the rest appearing 15 minutes later. The rescue attempt was dealt it's final blow when it was learned that one of the aircraft had lost its primary hydralic system and was unsafe to use fully loaded for the assault. Only five aircraft were servicable and six needed, so the mission was aborted. And there were other problems. A bus came by on a dirt road shortly after the lead C-130 landed. Its driver and about 40 passengers were held until the Americans left. Disaster
The C-130 was evacuated and the order came to blow the aircraft and exfiltrate the country. However, in the dust and confusion the order never reached the people who would blow the aircraft. There were wounded and dying men to be taken care of and the aircraft had to be moved to avoid having the burning debris start another fire. Because of this failure to destroy the helicopters, the Americans left behind them 5 RH-53D intact and top secret plans fell into the hands of the Iranians the next day and the agents waiting in-country to help the Delta operators were almost captured. 
Debris of the EC-130E BuNo 62-1809 Lockheed Hercules c/n 3770
After Eagle Claw a long negotiation follows, including the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war. Was on 19 January 1981 when Secretary Christopher signs the accord at 3:35 E.S.T. and on January 20, after last-minute delays over fund transfers, the hostages leave Teheran on the 444th day of their captivity, minutes after President Carter leaves office. On January 21, citizen Carter greets the hostages at Weisbaden, West Germany. Operation Honey Badger which was to be the second attempt to rescue the hostages from Iran was no longer necessary. The LessonsAlthough the results of the mission were tragic, Operation Eagle Claw’s contribution to the American military was invaluable. The lessons learned from the mission illustrated serious deficiencies in the capability of the American military. The mission forced the political and military leadership to address these inadequacies and initiate changes. Military reforms would be complete and revolutionary. In particular, the mission was a major contributor to the changing of service parochialism. The mission contributed to the development of Jointness.
Eagle Claw identified Helicopters RH-53D serial number 158761 destroyed in collision with EC-130E BuNo 62-1809 5 RH-53D serials 158686, 158744, 158750, 158753 and 158758 abandoned or destroyed at Desert one. Sikorsky RH-53D built :
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